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Norman MacDonald* Electronic Surveillance in Crime
Detection: An Analysis of
Canadian Wiretapping Law
I. Introduction
Wiretapping and electronic surveillance by law enforcement agencies has
been going on in Canada for decades. An inquiry by the McDonald
Commission in 1981 reveals this as part of normal activities of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police.' Now new technologies have enlarged the
capacity of police in the surveillance area. Some of these developments
include:
1) Laser beams and electronic rays capable of picking up and
transmitting voices in the room when aimed at a walt or window.
2) Miniature listening devices known as "bugs". Once installed these
devices can overhear and record everything in the room and transmit up
to half a mile away.
3) Miniature microphones that can be worn on an individual who
engages in conversation with the suspect.
4) Wiretapping - the interception of telephone communications. This
involves a connection to the wires over which conversation is taking
place.
5) Parabolic microphones that can overhear without being placed in the
premises.
6) Combination mirror - transmitter capable of picling up both sight
and sound.2
The thought of police abuse and government interference with
individual privacy is not far fetched. The possibility of being a target of
electronic surveillance is frightening. Hence a discussion of the relevant
law in this area is desired.
1. Summary
At present some of the most technologically advanced equipment capable
*LL.B. Dalhousie, 1986. The original version of this article was prepared in the context of a
seminar on law and technology taught by Professor Bankier at Dalhousie University.
1. Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police - Second leport (2 vols. 1981), vol. 1, (hereafter McDonald Commission
Second Report).
2. See Berger v. New York 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Manning, The Protection of Privacy Act, Bill
C-176 (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974): Watt, Law of Electronic Surveillance in Canada
(Toronto: Carswell, 1979).
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of keeping an individual under auditory and visual surveillance
indefinitely is available to law enforcement agencies in Canada. The
Protection of Privacy Act3 which forms Part IV.I of the Criminal Code
4
under the title of "Invasion of Privacy" sets out authorization criteria for
police officers and law enforcement personnel in using such devices. In
addition electronic surveillance can be carried on completely outside the
ambit of judicial control, as described in Part IV.I, by obtaining a warrant
under the Official Secrets Act'.
It is clear then that in enacting the Protection of Privacy Act Parliament
recognized for the first time an individual's right to privacy while at the
same time allowing state sanctioned electronic eavesdropping for the
purpose of crime detection. The study of electronic surveillance must
therefore involve an analysis of competing interests between the
individual and the state. On the one hand the individual has a right to
privacy. Use of electronic surveillance devices by government agencies
could lead us into a "1984" type of society where "Big Brother" is
watching everything.6 On the other hand the state has an interest in
protecting its citizens from criminals and criminal activities.
The purpose of this essay is to examine the law of electronic
surveillance in crime detection and how this relates to the privacy of the
individual. In doing so it is necessary to take a look at the history of
eavesdropping laws in Canada as well as the provisions of the Protection
of Privacy Act.7 An analysis of relevant case law in this area should be
useful in determining if the Act is operating in accord with the policies
behind it. Finally, the future of electronic surveillance in Canada will be
discussed.
II. History of Eavesdropping Laws in Canada
Prior to the Protection of Privacy Act8 there was no legislation to regulate
and control the use of electronic surveillance devices by law enforcement
personnel. At common law eavesdropping was recognized as a nuisance
offence.9 One could therefore argue that this could be applied against law
enforcement people who engage in electronic surveillance. The practice
of eavesdropping, however, does not seem to have ever been regarded as
an indictable offence. In R. v. Mason,10 one of the first Canadian cases on
3. S.C. 1973-74, c. 50.
4. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as amended.
5. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended.
6. see George Orwell's 1984.
7. S.C. 1973-74, c. 50.
8. S.C. 1973-74, c. 50.
9. 4 Blackstone Commentaries, 168 (Lewis ed., 1897).
10. (1918), 39 D.L.R. 54 (Que. P.M.C.).
Electronic Surveillance in Crime Detection
eavesdropping, it was held that eavesdropping was not a common law
offence in Canada and was therefore not punishable. Further, in The
King v. County of London Quarter Sessions Appeals Committee, Ex. p.
Metropolitan Police Commission, Lord Goddard stated that "no instance
can be found in the books of any indictment being preferred for this
offence at common law"." This case was later applied in Re Copeland
and Adamson12 where an application to prohibit police wiretapping was
denied on the grounds that it was neither an offence nor was there any
common law right to privacy. Grant J. was of the view that it was for
Parliament to impose limitations on wiretapping and not the courts.
The only federal legislation dealing with intercepting private
communicatons at that time was s. 25 of An Act to Incorporate the Bell
Telephone Company of Canada 13 which read:
Any person who shall willfully or maliciously injure, molest or destroy any
of the lines, posts or property of the Company, or in any way willfully
obstruct or interfere with the working of the said telephone lines, and
intercept any message transmitted thereon shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
This statute, however, was never used to prohibit police officers from
engaging in wiretapping nor to prosecute anyone who tapped a
telephone. In Re Copeland and Adamson14 Grant J. held that although
s. 25 makes it an offence to "interfere with" or to "intercept" telephone
conversations, wiretapping could not be an offence within the meaning of
that section since it does not impede or disturb a telephone conversation
and in any event police officers acting with reasonable and probable
grounds are justified in doing whatever they are required to do under the
Criminal Code. He then went on to review the Privacy Act15 of British
Columbia which created a tort, actionable without proof of damage,
against anyone willfully and without claim of right to violate the privacy
of another. The legislation specifically provided that privacy may be
violated by eavesdropping or surveillance whether or not accompanied
by trespass.16 There were, however, exemptions from liability for peace
officers acting in the course of their duty.17 In refusing to be influenced by
the British Columbia legislation Grant J. held that no other province in
Canada allows a right of privacy per se or a remedy for the breach
thereof.
11. (1948) 1 K.B. 670 at 675 (C.A.).
12. (1972), 28 D.L.R. (3d) 26 (Ont. H.C.).
13. S.C., 1880 43 Vict. c-67.
14. Supra, note412.
15. S.B.C. 1968, c. 39.
16. Ids. 2(3).
17. Ids. 3(1).
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Other provinces began to establish privacy and telephone legislation in
the late 1960's and early 70's. Provincial privacy legislation, like that of
British Columbia, created a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for
anyone willfully and without claim of right, to violate the privacy of
another."8 Telephone legislation created an offence, punishable on
summary conviction, for anyone unlawfully interfering with telephone
company equipment.19 While electronic surveillance was covered in both
types of legislation, police officers acting in execution of their duty, as in
British Columbia, were exempt from liability. In fact, telephone
companies cooperated with law enforcement agencies in tapping
telephone lines.
Usually the only bodies regulating police wiretapping activities were
the provincial Police Commissions who set guidelines for electronic
surveillance. This required that the officer had reasonable and probable
grounds for conducting a wiretap and that the Chief of Police gave his
permission.2f The officer requesting a wiretap would go to his immediate
supervisor who then went to the Chief of Police to get it authorized.
Hence, we had a situation where the police were policing themselves.
Sometimes officers would act on their own initiative without informing
or getting approval of those in command. This was discovered by the
McDonald Commission's investigation into R.C.M.P. activities. 21 The
Royal Canadian Mounted Police officially maintained a policy against
wiretapping yet nevertheless it went on. It appears that any controls
maintained were very slack.
Disturbed about possible police abuses that may have been going on,
Parliament, in the late 1960's and early 70's, set up committees to study
the matter of electronic surveillance. The first of these committees was
the Canadian Committee on Corrections (hereafter called the Ouimet
Committee). The Ouimet Committee realized that wiretapping was
commonly used by police forces in criminal investigations and that there
was no control over their activities. The Committee was of the view that
federal legislation controlling the use of wiretapping by police forces
should be implemented. In addition they recommended that wiretapping
and electronic eavesdropping for criminal purposes should be outlawed
but that there should be an exception for law enforcement purposes
subject to strict controls.22
18. The Privacy Act, S.M. 1970, c. 74; S.S. 1973-74, c. 80.
19. The Telephone Act, S.M. 1970, c. 74; R.S.O. 1970, c. 457; The Alberta Government
TelephoneAct R.S.A. 1970, c. 12; TheRural Telephone Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 273.
20. Interview, Cpl. E Baisley, Halifax Police Dept., (Nov. 1984); Re Copeland and Adamson,
supra, note 11.
21. McDonald Commission Third Report, (1981).
22. Canada, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections (1969), at 83.
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The House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal
Affairs studied the matter in 1970 and made several recommendations
that were adopted including:
1) Wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping should be made criminal
offences.
2) Only specified crimes should be subject to electronic surveillance.
3) There should be stringent controls and defined limits on police use of
electronic surveillance.
4) Procedures for applications to use electronic devices and obtaining
judicial authorization.
5) There should be a time limit on how long the devices can be used.
6) A yearly report to Parliament by the Attorney General.3
In addition the Task Force on Privacy and Computers studied the area
of privacy in relation to wiretapping and concluded that the privacy of
the individual should be balanced against social and political values.
The result of these studies led to the introduction of the Bill on
Privacy.24 After dying on the order paper twice and after adopting many
recommendations from the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal
Affairs, The Protection of Privacy Act's was finally passed and came into
effect on June 30, 1974. The Act was modelled after Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196826 (hereafter
referred to as Title III), its American counterpart legislation. The Act
remained in its original state for three years until significant changes were
made with the passage of ss. 7 to 12 of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 197727.
III. The Protection of Privacy Act
28
1. General Outline of the Act
The Protection of Privacy Act was Parliament's attempt to recognize an
individual's right to privacy by making it illegal to intercept a person's
conversations without that person's consent. At the same time, however,
Parliament recognized the utility of electronic surveillance in crime
detection and created exemptions from liability for law enforcement
23. Canada, Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Fourth Report contained 8 in
the minutes and proceedings of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, No. 7,
February 5, 1970, 2nd Session, 28th Parliament No. 7:7.
24. Manning, supra, note 2 at 1-2.
25. S.C. 1973-74, c. 50.
26. 18 U.S.C. ss. 2510-20 (1970), originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, ss. 802, 82 Stat. 212.
27. S.C. 1976-77, c. 53.
28. S.C. 1973-74, c. 50, as amended.
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purposes. The resulting new Act amended the Criminal Code,29 the
Crown Liability Act30 and the Official Secrets Act31. These amendments
will now be examined.
(a). Amendments to the Criminal Code
The Protection of Privacy Act added a new part, Part IVI, entitled
"Invasion of Privacy" to the Criminal Code.32 This part created three new
indictable offences those of i) willfully intercepting a private
communication by means of electronic devices ii) possessing, selling or
purchasing these devices knowing that they are designed for interception
of private communications and iii) disclosing information that has been
intercepted by means of these devices without the consent of the object
of the interception (ss. 178.11, 178.18 and 178.20 respectively). The
maximum penalties provided are, five years imprisonment, in the case of
a wilful interception, and two years for the other offences. The additional
penalty sections allow for the forfeiture of any devices used as well as an
award for punitive damages up to a maximum of $5000. (ss. 178.19,
178.21). However, the offence creating sections provide exemptions from
any liability for law enforcement personnel.
In order to be exempt from liability, a police officer must either have
the consent of the party whose communication was intercepted or be
authorized to conduct an interception. The Act sets out steps to be
followed to obtain judicial authorization both to initiate and continue
electronic surveillance (ss. 178.12 to 178.15 inclusive). The judge must
be satisfied that to grant an authorization order would be in the best
interests of the administration of justice or that other investigative
techniques have been tried and failed and are unlikely to succeed or that
it would be impractical to use other investigative procedures. The
authorization order must contain details of the interception and is only
valid for a period not exceeding sixty days. The authorization can of
course be renewed but again each renewal period cannot exceed sixty
days. All of the documents related to the application of authorization are
placed in a sealed packet and kept in a secret place until ordered opened
by a judge. The regular procedure can be by-passed in the case of an
emergency but in such a case the authorization is only valid for up to 36
hours.
The Act also provides evidentiary rules in respect of both evidence of
intercepted private communications and evidence obtained either directly
29. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as amended.
30. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, as amended.
31. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended.
32. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as amended.
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or indirectly as a result of information acquired through the interception
(ss. 178.15, 178.16 and 178.17). Evidence is only admissible where the
interception was lawfully made or where there is consent to its admission.
Notwithstanding this provision, the judge has a discretionary power to
admit evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible if it is relevant and
if the only reason for not allowing it is because of a defect in form or
procedure in applying for the authorization.
In addition, the Act contains reporting sections requiring the Solicitor
General of Canada and the provincial Attorney General to publish
annual reports disclosing the extent of court authorized interceptions (s.
178.22) as well as requiring that notice be given to the objects of
interception within 90 days after the expiry of the authorization (s.
178.23). Section 178.23 provides that the judge can grant a delay before
notification must be given and also provides for exemption from the
notification requirement where the interception is made pursuant to a
warrant under the Official Secrets Act3 3.
The provisions of Part IV.I as well as the difficulties that have been
encountered in its operation will be discussed in more detail later in the
text.
(b). Amendments to the Crown Liability Act
The Protection of Privacy Act adds a new part, Part 1.1 to the Crown
Liability Act 34. This allows for civil liability to be imposed upon the
Crown where a Crown servant, by means of electronic surveillance,
intentionally intercepts a private communication or discloses information
that has been intercepted, in the course of his employment (ss. 7.2 and 7.3
respectively). The Crown is liable for all loss or damage caused by or
attributable to such an interception and, if no award has been made to the
plaintiff under section 178.21 of the Criminal Code35, for punitive
damages not exceeding five thousand dollars.
Just as there are saving provisions in the Criminal Code36 the Crown
Liability Act37 also provides exemptions from liability. In the case of an
intentional interception (s. 7.2) the Crown is not liable where the
interception was either i) lawfully made ii) was made with the consent of
the originator or the person intended to receive the private communication
or iii) or was made by a Crown servant in the process of random radio
monitoring.38 The term "lawfully made" has been held to mean an
33. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended.
34. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, as amended.
35. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as amended.
36. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as amended.
37. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, as amended.
38. Crown Liability Ac4 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, s. 7.2(2).
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interception that has been made in accordance with any of the
exemptions provided in s. 178.11(2) of the Code.39 Thus a person acting
in good faith who aids in any way a person whom he has reasonable and
probable grounds to believe is acting with an authorization is exempt
from liability.40
In the case of an intentional disclosure of information obtained by use
of electronic surveillance, the Crown can avoid liability if the disclosure
took place under the following circumstances:
i) with the express consent of the originator or the person intended to
receive the private communication;
ii) in the course of giving evidence in any civil or criminal proceedings;
iii) in the course of any criminal investigation if the private
communication was lawfully intercepted;
iv) in giving notice under s. 178.16 of the Code or furnishing further
particulars pursuant to an order under s. 178.17;
v) in the course of random radio monitoring;
vi) where disclosure is made to a peace officer in the interest of the
administration of justice.41
There is very little authority interpreting the provisions of Part IV.I
with respect to civil liability but it is clear that civil liability was not
intended to apply to law enforcement personnel that conduct electronic
surveillance with the requisite authorization.
(c). Amendment to the Official Secrets Act
The amendment to the Official Secrets Act 42 adds a new section, section
16, which allows the Solicitor General of Canada to issue a warrant
authorizing the interception or seizure of "any communication" where he
is satistied that it is necessary for the prevention or detection of subversive
activity directed against Canada or detrimental to the security of Canada
or that it is necessary for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence
essential to the security of Canada.43 The provisions of this amendment
fall outside the ambit of both Part IV.I and the Crown Liability AcL44 The
warrant may be issued to any individual and is not limited to police
officers. It is probable that such a warrant will be issued to agents of the
new civilian Security Service formed under the Canadian Intelligence
39. R v. Cremascoli(1977), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 212 at218 (Ont. C.A.).
40. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 178.11(2)(b).
41. Crown Liability Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, s. 7.3(2).
42. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended.
43. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended, s. 16(2).
44. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, as amended.
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Security Service Act.45 There is no limit to the length of time that such a
warrant will be in force.
The amendment gives a wide meaning to the term "subversive
activity". Under s. 16(3) subversive activity includes:
(a) espionage or sabotage;
(b) foreign intelligence activities directed toward gathering intelligence
information relating to Canada;
(c) activities directed toward accomplishing governmental change
within Canada or elsewhere by force or violence or any criminal
means;
(d) activities by a foreign power directed toward actual or potential
attack or other hostile acts against Canada; or
(e) activities of a foreign terrorist group directed toward the
commission of terrorist acts in or against Canada.46
The Amendment provides that a warrant issued under this Act shalt
contain details of the interception including the type of communication to
be intercepted, the persons who may make the interception and the
length of time the warrant is to be in force.47
There is also a reporting section requiring the Solicitor General to
prepare an annual report to Parliament detailing the number of warrants
issued, the average length of time that a warrant was in force, the
methods of interception used, and an assessment of the importance of the
warrants issued.48 The difference between this section and the reporting
sections of Part IV.I is that the annual report under this Act contains less
information and there is no notice requirement to the objects of
interception.
This amendment seems to be more in favour of electronic surveillance
with minimal controls than Part IV.I. The Act allows the by-passing of
regular procedures for obtaining judicial authorization to conduct
electronic surveillance. There is no control as to the form and substance
the applications for authorization must take. For example there is no
provision that there must be a formal written application with an
accompanying affidavit from the applicant as in Part IV.I. The
application and subsequent granting of the authorization is not limited to
designated agents as in Part IV.I. Anyone can apply for and obtain a
warrant. There is no limit on the length of time that a warrant can be in
force. All of these factors are at the discretion of the Solicitor General.
45. S.C. 1984, c. 21.
46. Official Secrets Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended, s. 16(3).
47. Official SecreisAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended, s. 16(4).
48. Official Secrets Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended, s. 16(5).
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As to the circumstances under which a warrant can be issued, the
definition of "subversive activity" covers such a wide area that it could
conceivably apply to almost anything. For example "activities directed
toward accomplishing a governmental change" 49 could include many of
the peaceful demonstrations that go on in Canada today such as anti-
nuclear or anti-abortion protests. Similarly the other provisions defining
subversive activity are quite vague and could be interpreted as the
Solicitor General of the day sees fit.
The evidentiary rules provided in Part IV.I are not applicable under the
Official Secrets Act.50 This means that an interception does not
necessarily have to be one which is lawfully made in order to be
admissible as evidence. Further, there is no provision requiring that
particulars of the interception as well as notice that it will be presented at
trial must be given to the accused. Under Part IV.I failure to comply with
these terms will result in the evidence being inadmissible.".
Section 16 of the Official Secrets Act 52 is probably the most
frightening of the three amendments since it contains virtually no controls
regarding the interception of private communications. In fact it can be
used to intercept any communication. While Part IV.I also condones
electronic surveillance it does so while maintaining safeguards for
individual privacy.
2. Part IVI - Invasion of Privacy
Part IV.I of the Criminal Code53 allows for the interception of private
communications by means of electronic surveillance where it is done for
law enforcement purposes and under judicial authorization. However,
electronic surveillance can still be carried on without judicial
authorization if it is done with the consent of one of the parties of
interception or if the surveillance activity falls outside the scope of the
Act.
(a). Electronic Surveillance Without JudicialAuthorization
Before the judicial authorization criteria of Part IV.I must be followed,
the surveillance activity must fall within the scope of the Act. If the
activity does not come within the definitions in Part IV.I then
authorization is not required. This section will take a look at the relevant
definitions as well as the consent provision of Part IV.I.
49. Official Secrets Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended, s. 16(3)(c).
50. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended.
51. Part IV.I, s. 178.16(4).
52. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended.
53. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as amended.
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(i) Private Communication Requirement
Before a police officer is required to get judicial authorization to conduct
electronic surveillance, the communication in question must be such that
it falls within the definition of a private communication which is:
any oral communication or any telecommunication made under
circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator thereof to expect
that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended
by the originator thereof to receive it.5
The test then appears to be an objective one requiring a reasonable
expectation of privacy from the originator. However, courts have also
utilized a subjective element looking to the mind of the originator. In
R. v. Carothers; Richardson v. Brunhoffer55 the originators suspected
that their telephone was tapped but continued to use that method of
communication. The trial judge held that as soon as the suspicion became
manifest the communication was no longer "private" as defined in Part
1VI. However, just because the originator has a suspicion, this does not
necessarily mean that the communication is no longer a private one. If
the originator can reasonable expect that his communication will not be
overheard then it is a private communication. In determining the
reasonable expectation one must consider the surrounding circumstances.
Mr. David Watt, Senior Crown Counsel with the Ontario Attorney-
General's Department, has summarized the law in this area in his treatise:
Whether any given communication asserted to fall within the definition of
"private communication" in Part IV.I does so, will depend upon the
circumstances surrounding its making. It would seem obvious that
statements uttered for public consumption in a public forum, or to public
officials would provide the clearest example of a statement beyond the
reach of Part IV.I. Equally, in relation to the subjective expectation of
privacy, a communicant who chooses a method of communication which
exposes his statements to uninvited ears can scarcely assert a reasonable
expectation of privacy in response to his implicit invitation to listen.
Absent circumstances negating the subjective expectation of privacy of the
originator of the statements, the inquiry then shifts to the reasonable
expectation of privacy, a matter of inference in light of all relevant facts
and circumstances. Relevant considerations include the location, content
and purpose of the communication, the means by which it is transmitted,
and the nature of the means, or techniques, if any, employed by the
originator to prevent being overheardV6
Central to the issue of private communication is who can be regarded
as an originator. In R. v. Miller and Thomas (No. 1),57 the court held that
54. Part IV.I,s. 178.1.
55. [1978] 6 W.W.R. 571 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
56. Watt, Law of Electronic Surveillance in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1979).
57. (1975), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 94 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
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the person making the telephone call in question is the originator. In face
to face conversations it has been held that the person who speaks first is
the originator. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has recently
defined the originator as "the person who makes the remark or series of
remarks which the Crown seeks to adduce as evidence". 58 Thus if an
undercover police officer speaks first in a face to face conversation he
cannot be regarded as the originator, and therefore his consent to the
interception is irrelevant.
(ii). Interception Requirement
Another condition which must exist before the provisions of Part IV.I can
be invoked is that the communication must have been intercepted. Under
Part IV.I this means:
listen to, record or acquire a communication or acquire the substance,
meaning or purport thereof 9
There have been several interpretations of what constitutes an
interception. In R. v. McQueen60 a police officer answered several
telephone calls and took certain bets during a raid on a room alleged to
be a common betting house. Under a strict interpretation of the Act the
trial judge invoked the exclusionary provisions of s. 178.16(1) on the
grounds that the lack of both consent on the part of the originator or the
person intended to receive the communication and the lack of judicial
authorization resulted in an illegal interception and the evidence was
therefore inadmissible. On appeal it was held that the trial judge erred in
excluding the evidence since there had not been an interception of a
private communication. McDermid J.A. concluded that in absence of
any interference between the place of origination and the intended
destination of the communication there could not be an interception. The
exclusionary provisions of Part IV.I could not be invoked as long as the
originator intended the person who answered the telephone to receive the
message. The fact that he was mistaken as to the identity of the receiver
is irrelevant.61
Other authorities suggest that the element of a third party is essential
to an interception. In R. v. Dunn62 a police officer listening on an
extension telephone, with the consent of the intended recipient, heard the
originator utter death threats and obscenities. The court found that the
fact that the caller did not identify the recipient other than by her voice,
58. R v. Goldman (1980), 13 C.R. (3d) 228 at 248 per McIntyre J. (S.C.C.).
59. Part IV.I, s. 178.1.
60. (1975), 25 C.C.C. (2d) 262 (Alta. C.A.).
61. Supro, note 59 at 265-66.
62. (1975), 33 C.R.N.S. 299 (N.S. Co. Ct.).
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suggested that he did not expect another person to be listening in.
Accordingly he found that there had been an interception within the
terms of Part IV.I.
In the United States difficulties in interpreting the word "intercept" do
not occur as readily as under Part IV.1 since Title III offers a broader
definition. Title III defines intercept as:
The aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device.
63
Under this definition an interception has been held to involve the
overhearing of a communication in which the eavesdropper is neither a
participant nor an intended listener.64 Using this interpretation, an
accused would only need to show a reasonable expectation of privacy
before invoking the prohibitory and exclusionary provisions of Part IV.I,
provided of course the interception itself was illegal.
(iii). The Requirement of an Electromagnetic, Acoustic, Mechanical or
Other Device
Another necessary element before Part IV.I can come into play is that the
interception must have occurred by use of an "electromagnetic, acoustic,
mechanical or other device". This is defined as:
any device or apparatus that is used or is capable of being used to intercept
a private communication, but does not include a hearing aid used to
correct subnormal hearing of the user to not better than normal hearing.65
While it appears that this definition could include everything other
than a hearing aid, there have been difficulties in intefpvetation. In R. v.
McQueen66 it was held that there had been no electromagnetic, acoustic
mechanical or other device involved when a police officer answered
incoming calls at a gaming house. In R. v. Dunn67, however, listening in
on an extension telephone was held to involve such devices. The two
decisions are difficult to reconcile since it appears that an ordinary
telephone does not fall within the above definition yet an extension
telephone does.
Another definition problem is raised in cases involving interception by
use of video devices. In R. v. Irwin and Sansome et aL68 evidence of
illegal gambling was obtained through the use of a closed circuit video
camera and a wireless microphone. The trial judge rejected the evidence
63. Title III, s. 2510(4).
64. U.S. v. King 335 R Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal., 1971).
65. Part IV.I,s. 178.1.
66. Supra, note 60.
67. Supra, note 62.
68. (1975), 32 C.R.N.S. 398 (ont. C.A.).
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under Part IV.I. On appeal this was held to have been improperly rejected
since the evidence had been obtained prior to the passage of Part IV.I.
Since then there does not appear to be any cases deciding whether
video surveillance involves the use of an electromagnetic, acoustic,
mechanical or other device. Watt submits that video surveillance without
any sound recording does not fall within the ambit of Part IV.I.69
However, the definition of private communication under Part IV.I
includes any telecommunication. Under the Interpretation Act70
telecommunication means:
any transmission, emission or reception of signs, writing or images or
intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, visual or other electromagnetic
system.
This definition of telecommunication could be used to include video
surveillance.
(iv). Electronic Surveillance with the Consent of a Party
An interception without judicial authorization can still be carried out
where the originator of the private communication or the person
intended to receive it has given his consent, express or implied, to the
interception.71 The consent must be free and voluntary and not extracted
through coercion.72 However, consent given for fear of going to prison is
valid. In R. v. Rosen73 consent had been given by co-conspirators as part
of a plea bargain to avoid imprisonment. The court held that the impurity
of the motives for consenting did not vitiate the consent as long as it was
given free of duress and coercion. Thus if a conspirator consents due to
favours offered him by the Crown, then the consent is still valid.
Even where consent to intercept the communication has been given
there are still evidentiary difficulties involved. Under s. 178.16 an
intercepted communication is inadmissible as evidence unless lawfully
made or the originator or person intended to receive the communication
has expressly consented to the admission. In Goldman, the ques-
tion of whether a further consent to admission was needed arose.
The court held that the consent obtained under s. 178.11 made the
interception one which was "lawfully made" and therefore no further
consent was required to admit the intercepted communication as
evidence.
69. Watt, supra, note 56 at 48.
70. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-23, s. 28.
71. Part IV., ss. 178.11(2)(a), 178.11(3).
72. 1. v. Goldman, supra, note 58 at 250.
73. (1976), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 565 (Ont. H.C.).
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Having the consent of one of the parties turns what otherwise would
be an illegal activity into a legal one. Hence, there is no need to obtain
judicial authorization. Similarly, if the surveillance activity does not fall
within the definitions in s. 178.1 then the provisions of Part IV.I do not
apply. In all other cases judicial authorization is required.
(b). Electronic Surveillance With Judicial Authorization
An interception of a private communication can be lawfully made if it is
authorized by a judge of a superior court having criminal jurisdiction or
a judge as defined in s. 482 of the Criminal Code.14 The procedural
provisions setting out steps to be followed to obtain authorization both to
initiate and continue electronic surveillance are found in ss. 178.12 to
178.15 inclusive.
There are two types of authorizations that can be given. These are:
1) The conventional authorization obtainable on an ex parte application
for a period not exceeding sixty days;75
2) An emergency authorization obtainable on an exparte application to
a designated judge for a period of up to 36 hours.
76
In addition the conventional authorizations can be renewed for periods of
sixty days at a time under s. 178.13(4).
The procedure that is followed is basically the same throughout
Canada. The peace officer, who has been specially designated, presents a
written application along with an affidavit to the judge. If everything is
in order the judge will usually grant an authorization order premitting the
communications of the named and unnamed individuals to be
intercepted for a specified period of time. A similar procedure follows the
renewal process. All material related to the application, except the
authorization or renewal order, is sealed in a packet and kept in a secret
place in the custody of the court.
There are formal requirements that must be followed in order to get an
authorization. First, the application must come from the provincial
Attorney General or the Solicitor General of Canada or one of their
agents specially designated in writing. For criminal offences the
application must come from the Attorney General or one of his agents.
For conspiracies to violate federal statutes as well as any remaining
offences, the applications must come from the Solicitor General's
people.77
74. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as amended.
75. Part IV.I, s. 178.13(2).
76. Part IV., s. 178.15(2).
77. Part IV.I, s. 178.12(1).
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Accompanying the application must be the affidavit of the agent
stating among other things:
1) the offence in respect of which the interception is sought;
2) the identity, if known, of the person(s) whose communication is to be
intercepted;
3) a description of the premises at which the interception will be
intercepted as well as the location;
4) a description of the manner of interception to be used; and
5) whether other investigative techniques have been tried and failed or
why it appears unlikely that they will succeed.78
In addition the affidavit and the authorization order must contain
reference to individuals whose identities are not known if the police wish
to lawfully intercept communications of those who may use the same
premises as the named person.
In granting the authorization the judge is not obliged to state his
reasons for doing so although he must be satisfied that it would be in the
best interests of the administration of justice or that other investigative
procedures have been tried and have failed or that they are unlikely to
succeed.79 Having met all of these requirements the judge will grant the
authorization order although he can request more information before
doing so.
A renewal application follows the same procedure and is viewed as an
extension of the original application. It cannot include new objects of
interception or new offences or else it is treated as an original application.
Once an authorization has been granted all documents related to the
application, except for the authorization or renewal order, are placed in
a packet and sealed by the judge to whom the application was made. The
documents are then kept in the custody of the court in a place to which
the public has no access and cannot be opened except for dealing with a
renewal or pursuant to an order from a superior court judge of criminal
jurisdiction.8 0
Pursuant to s. 178.23 notice of an interception must be given to the
parties in question within 90 days after the expiry of the authorization or
its renewal. This does not apply in the case of a warrant under the
Official Secrets Act,8' however.
Thus the Protection of Privacy Act 82 has resulted in state sanctioned
electronic surveillance for the purpose of crime detection. The
78. Id
79. Part IV.I, s. 178.13.
80. Part IV., s. 178.14.
81. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3.
82. S.C. 1973-74, c. 50.
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amendments to the Criminal Code83 and the Official Secrets Act84 raise
some serious questions that should be addressed in light of basic policy
considerations.
IV. Policy Considerations
When the House of Commons and the Standing Committee on Justice
and Legal Affairs studied the matter of electronic surveillance in crime
detection, they recognized that the provisions of the proposed Act
touched on delicate areas. The Act was a political bombshell at the time
and was passed on the basis that if there were difficulties in its operation
certain provisions could be changed. The Act has been in effect now for
over ten years and many difficulties have been encountered in the way
the provisions have been carried out. Accordingly, it is necessary to
examine the policies behind the Act to see if they are being carried out.
1. Purpose and Intent of the Act
The general purpose of the Act was to increase the protection of privacy
in Canada by making it illegal to intercept private conversations unless
done so in an authorized manner for law enforcement purposes.
Parliament recognized the utility of electronic surveillance in crime
detection and so it created exemptions from liability for the purpose of
law enforcement. The Act set out procedures that had to be followed
before an interception could be lawfully made. Thus Parliament tried to
create a balance between individual privacy and the state's maintenance
of law and order.
The question then arises as to whether the Act functions in accordance
with the purposes for which it was designed. Is the balance between the
individual and the state being effectively maintained? We have already
seen situations where electronic surveillance can be lawfully carried out
without any authorization. This seems to conflict with Parliament's intent
of maintaining strict controls over the use of such surveillance devices by
law enforcement personnel. In addition there are operative provisions of
the Act that conflict with the intent of Parliament. These defects occur
under both the Criminal Code5 and the Official Secrets Act. 86 They will
now be examined.
2. Conflicts With the Intent of Parliament
Certain provisions of the Act and the way they are being carried out
83. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as amended.
84. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended.
85. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as amended.
86. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended.
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infringe too greatly on the privacy of the individual. This is in direct
conflict with Parliament's intent to maintain a balance between
individual privacy and law enforcement. The scales have been tipped in
favour of our police forces. Accordingly, it is necessary to discuss these
provisions.
(a). Offences in Which Electronic Surveillance Can Be Used
When the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs was studying
the matter, they sought to limit the use of electronic surveillance to
"serious crimes that threaten life and individual and group well being to
such an extent that the protection of privacy must yield to protection
against anti-social activities" 87. The provisions of the present Act,
however, list over fifty offences in Part IV.188 as well as giving a wide
discretion to conduct surveillance under the Official Secrets Ac19 where
there is a threat to national security. This clearly goes beyond the
proposals of the Standing Committee.
Since the American parallel, Title III, was the model for the present
Act, it is useful to look at the comparative legislation. Under Title III
there is also a lengthy list of crimes in respect of which electronic
surveillance can be used. This probably explains the similar feature in our
Canadian legislation. Policy makers in the United States, however, have
been debating the issue of electronic surveillance longer than their
Canadian counterparts. In limiting the scope of such law enforcement
tools, the American Bar Association also felt that electronic surveillance
should be limited to serious crimes.
In helping define what constitutes a "serious" crime for which
electronic surveillance should be used, the British Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure sets the following guidelines:
Whether a particular coercive power should be available in respect of a
particular offence will vary to some extent with the nature of the offence
and the way in which it is likely to be investigated. In our view the
following categories of offence (including where appropriate, attempts or
conspiracies to commit those offences) should be covered: serious offences
against the person or serious sexual offences (murder, manslaughter,
causing grievous bodily harm, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape); serious
offences of damaging property (arson, causing explosions); serious
dishonesty offences (counterfeiting, corruption, and burglary theft and
frauds, where major amounts are involved); and a miscellaneous group
87. Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Fourth Report contained in Minutes
and Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs No. 7, February 5,
1970,2nd Session, 28th Parliament, No. 7:7.
88. See Appendix C.
89. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended.
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(the supply, importation or exportation of controlled drugs, perversion of
the course ofjustice, and blackmail).90
The emphasis throughout this guideline is on serious offences against
individual or group well being - something not present in the offences
listed in Part IVI.
It is clear then that the proposals of the Standing Committee have not
been implemented in the Protection of Privacy Act91. At present we have
a lengthy list of crimes in Part IV.I as well as a wide definition of
"Subversive activity" in the Official Secrets Act.92 Accordingly, the scope
of electronic surveillance under the present Act should be limited.
(b). The Application Process
The main concern with the application process in the present Act appears
to be the unfairness of the exparte application itself. This submission rests
on the lack of procedural safeguards in both Pat IV.I and the Official
Secrets Act.93 This reduces the controls on electronic surveillance that
Parliament intended.
The nature of ex parte hearings themselves lend suspicion to possible
abuses of due process since there is no third party representing the
individual's interests. Under the Official Secrets Act94 the sole authority
for granting applications rests with the Solicitor General. Under Part IV.I
fears of judicial rubber stamping have been justified by instances of
application hearings taking only half an hour with some lasting less than
fifteen minutes.95
The Official Secrets Act96 is the worst of the amendments because it
has virtually no safeguards at all. There is no provision that the
application must be in writing, that there must be an accompanying
affidavit, or that any other particulars must be stated. All that is required
is that the Solicitor General be satisfied by evidence on oath that an
interception is necessary for the security of Canada.
Similarly under Part IV.I there is the possibility of abuse of process.
The McDonald Commission found instances of judge shopping.97 The
applicants would apply to a judge after they had been turned down by a
different judge until they got the desired result. In the United States a
system of random judicial rotation exists where the prosecutor is required
90. United Kingdom, Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (1981) at 24.
91. S.C. 1973-74, c. 50.
92. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3.
93. Id
94. Id
95. McDonald Commission Second Report, vol. 2, at 1021.
96. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended.
97. McDonald Commission Second Report, vol. 2, at 1021.
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to appear at a designated place and time to present his application. This
method might reduce the possibility of judge shopping in Canada.
In either application hearing the interests of the individual are not
represented. In Britain the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure
recommended that "the interests of the person subject to surveillance
should be represented by the Official Solicitor or a similar body" 98. This
would be desireable in Canada and consistent with the intent of
Parliament in maintaining safeguards for the individual.
(c). Reviewing the Authorization Packet
The inaccessibility of the authorization packet has raised concerns for the
object of interception. Under s. 178.14 all documents related to the
application are placed in a sealed packet and retained in a place to which
the public has no access. The packet cannot be opened except for
purposes of renewal or by order of a judge. This denies defence counsel
the opportunity to see if there are any defects in the application
documents.
Canadian case law suggests that the authorization packet is only
accessible where there is extrinsic evidence to support an allegation of
fraud or wilful non-disclosure.99 This means that if a police officer was
granted an authorization because he had stated in his affidavit that other
investigative procedures had been tried when in fact they had not been,
in absence of extrinsic evidence to prove this, defence counsel has no way
of reviewing the application documents to show that the authorization
was obtained by fraud.
Inaccessibility is not a concern to defence lawyers in the United States.
Under Title III a copy of the authorization order along with the
application documents must be furnished to both parties at least ten days
prior to trial.'00 Such a provision would be desireable in Canada to ensure
that there were no defects in the application documents.
(d). Execution of Surveillance Orders
Whether a police officer can enter the premises to install listening devices
pursuant to an authorization order has been at issue for some time now.
The matter has recently been decided by the Supreme Court of Canada.
At present the Canadian position seems to be that police can enter the
premises without consent of the owner. In both R. v. Lyons et aL 101 and
98. Supra, note 90 at 39.
99. R. v. Welsh (No. 6) (1977), 32 C.C.C. (2d) 363 (Ont. C.A.).
100. Title III, s. 2518(9).
101. (1985), 56 N.R. 6 (S.C.C.).
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the companion case Interception of Private Communications Reference'0 2
the Supreme Court of Canada held that Part IV.I does, by necessary
implication, authorize trespass to carry out interceptions and that an
authorization issued in the required terms includes authority to so trespass
unless expressly prohibited in the authorization order. A resulting
interception is therefore one which is "lawfully" made and communica-
tions received as a result of such interception are admissible as evidence.
Presumably this would also apply to an authorization given under the
Official Secrets Act. 03
Prior to this the law was undecided in the area. The leading case on
surreptitious entry was R. v. Dass'04 which held that an authorization
order did not give police officers authority to enter a premises without
consent in effecting an interception. Subsequent cases such as R. v.
Glesby et al,105 however, have held that Part IV.I gives an implied
authority to enter the premises for the purpose of installing listening
devices. The two conflicting views created uncertainty for lawyers,
judges, police officers and individuals.
An additional concern during the Dass period was whether evidence
obtained as a result of surreptitious entry was admissible. Under s. 178.16
of Part IV.I the interception must have been one which was lawfully
made before it is admissible as evidence. The judge, however, has a
discretionary power to admit evidence that would otherwise be
inadmissible if it is relevant and is only inadmissible due to a defect in
form or procedure in the application process.
In Dass the court held that a covert entry did not render the evidence
inadmissible. An authorization made the interception one Which was
"lawfully" made within the meaning of s. 178.16. How the authorization
was effected was only secondary to any evidence derived therefrom. The
accused, however, still had a civil action against the police officers for
trespass.
The only difference then between Dass and the recent Supreme Court
of Canada decision is that the former allowed the accused a civil remedy
against the police officers. Otherwise, there is no difference from the
accused's point of view. On the one hand Dass said that the police cannot
enter the premises while on the other hand it allowed evidence obtained
through surreptitious entry. Thus, although the police did not have a right
of entry any evidence obtained was admissible anyway. The Supreme
Court of Canada merely took away the civil remedy by making covert
entries legal.
102. (1985), 56 N.R. 43 (S.C.C.).
103. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended.
104. (1979), 8 C.R. (3d) 244 (Man. C.A.).
105. (1982), 2 C.R.R. 203, 19 Man. R. (2d) 438 (Co. Ct.).
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The Lyons'0 6 case relied heavily on the American decision of Dalia v.
U.S.10 7. In that case the Supreme Court of the United States analyzed the
purpose and history of Title III and concluded that Congress intended to
allow the courts to authorize electronic surveillance without limitations
upon the means of effecting it. Accordingly, no specific authorization of
surreptitious entry was required.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada did not consider the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms08 in its decision, Canadian
cases may still follow American decisions which allow police to enter the
premises in future Charter cases involving electronic surveillance. In
Dalia'09 the American Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
search and seizure was considered yet it was not persuasive enough to
convince the court against allowing covert entries to install listening
devices. Similarly, Glesbyn ° considered the right against unreasonable
search and seizure guaranteed in s. 8 of the Charter but followed Dalia.
These are some of the difficulties with the present Act. It is suggested
that the provisions discussed do not conform to the purpose and policies
behind the Act. An effective balance between individual privacy and law
enforcement has not been maintained. The prescriptions for change
implicit in the Charter could put the scales back into place.
V. Future Considerations
1. Charter Implications
The provisions of the Protection of Privacy Act"' clearly infringe upon
the individual's right to privacy as well as the accused's right to a fair
defence. The Canadian Bill of Rights"2 has not proved effective in
rectifying the situation. In Re Copeland and Adamson"3 it was held that
audio surveillance did not violate the due process clause because there is
no common law right to privacy. Similarly in R. v. Steinberg"4 it was
held that wiretapping did not contravene the right against self
incrimination in s. 2(d) of the Bill. It is hoped that the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms"5 will be useful in restoring the rights of the
individual.
106. Supra, note 101.
107. 47 U.S. Law Week 4423 (1979); 441 U.S. 238.
108. See the Constitution Act 1982 [en. by the Canada Ac4 1982 (U.K.), c. 11, Sched. B.],
Pt. 1.
109. Supra, note 107.
110. Supra, note 105.
111. S.C. 1973-74, c. 50, as amended.
112. R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III.
113. Supra, note 12.
114. [1967] 10. R. 733 (C.A.).
115. Supra, note 108.
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Since the Protection of Privacy Act 16 is largely an offspring of Title III,
it is possible that future Canadian cases will revolve around the American
decisions now that we too have a written Constitution. In the United
States the constitutionality of electronic surveillance by law enforcement
personnel has been dealt with on the basis of the Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable search and seizure. The Canadian counterpart
can be found in s. 8 of the Charter.
The American decisions suggest that invasion of privacy is an
important element in invoking the search and seizure provisions.
Applying the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. US.
117 Mr. Justice Stewart
stated that "what a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public may be constitutionally protected".
Canadian Charter decisions on the other hand have been reluctant to
include privacy as an element in electronic surveillance cases. In R. v.
Porter et aL118 it was held that surreptitious entry to install video
equipment and the recording of images on video tape constitutes neither
a search nor a seizure within the meaning of s. 8. The court was of the
view that a seizure contemplates the forcible taking or holding of a
person's possessions. It appears that privacy is not a possession capable of
being seized.
Similarly in R. v. Taylor"19, surreptitious entry to install listening
devices was held to constitute neither a search nor a seizure within the
meaning of s. 8 nor did it offend the right to life, liberty and security of
the person guaranteed in s. 7. The court held that the words search and
seizure do not involve notions of privacy.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada specifically declined to
comment on the Charter in Lyons120 it did follow Katz' 2' in an earlier
search case. Southam v. Hunter et a1122 was the subject of a search and
seizure by the Combines Investigation Branch being held unreasonable
within the meaning of s. 8. In that case the Supreme Court of Canada
held that s. 8 is not restricted to the protection of property but rather
guarantees a broad and general right to be secure from unreasonable
search and seizure which includes a person's entitlement to a reasonable
expectation of privacy. This could also apply to electronic surveillance.
What was an unreasonable search and seizure in Southam, however,
may not be unreasonable in electronic surveillance cases. At issue in
116. S.C. 1973-73. c. 50, as amended.
117. 389 U.S. 347 at 354 (1967).
118. (January 17, 1983), 9 W.C.B. 311 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
119. B.C.S.C., December 30, 1983 (unreported).
120. Supra, note 101.
121. Supra, note 117.
122. (1985), 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641 (S.C.C.).
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Southam was whether s. 10 of the Combines Investigation Act 123 allowing
the Director of Investigation and Research, or his representative, to enter
any premises and examine and take away documents relevant to matters
being inquired into, was inconsistent with s. 8 of the Charter and
therefore of no force and effect. In striking down the provision the
Supreme Court of Canada held that the authorization procedure, which
required only a certificate from a member of the Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission, was incapable of being carried out in an entirely
neutral and impartial manner and was therefore inconsistent with s. 8 of
the Charter. In order to be consistent with the Charter the court held that
the authorization procedure must be capable of being carried out in a
judicial manner. The reasoning in Southam would not therefore be
applicable under either Part IV.I or the Canadian Intelligence Security
Service Act' 24 since both require judicial authorization to conduct
surveillance. The ability to act judicially might, however, be in question
under the Official Secrets Act 25 which requires only the Solicitor
General's authorization.
An additional concern under the Charter is whether assuming
electronic surveillance is found to violate any guaranteed rights, it is
nevertheless a reasonable limit within the meaning of s. 1. This section
allows the state to violate a right or freedom if the infringement can be
justified. Although the balance of interests involved was not addressed in
Southam, the court did state that the onus of justifying a limitation upon
a right or freedom lies with the party seeking to invoke the limit i.e. the
state. Thus even if electronic surveillance was held to violate any rights
under the Charter it could still be permitted by virtue of s. 1.
From the early decisions it appears that the Charter might not be
useful in protecting the privacy of the individual in electronic surveillance
cases. The Supreme Court of Canada just gave a green light to law
enforcement agencies throughout Canada to use covert means in effecting
surveillances. There is some hope however, with the notion of privacy
being expressed in Southam as a constitutional right. The Supreme Court
of Canada should take a liberal stance in invoking the Charter in future
electronic surveillance cases. Failure to do so may bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. We could soon see instances of
police instigated crimes such as the John Delorean situation in the United
States. These "pro-active policing"'126 techniques actually help effect the
123. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23.
124. S.C. 1984, c. 21.
125. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended, s. 16.
126. Pro-active policing refers to acting before the crime is committed; Interview, Cpl. F.
Baisley, Halifax Police Dept., (Nov. 1984).
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crime. In such a situation this can hardly be called crime detection or law
enforcement. Legislative change may well be needed to implant the
balance between individual privacy and law enforcement that Parliament
had in mind.
2. Recommendations For Change
To alleviate some of the defects that have been discussed, the McDonald
Commission recommended several changes to the operation of the
existing Act. To ensure an unbiased operation of the Act, they
recommended the establishment of a National Review Commission,
similar to the United States National Wiretap Commission, to oversee
electronic surveillance by government agencies. 127 This Commission
would be permitted access to the sealed authorization packets, as well as
the intercepted communications, and could review the authorization
documents in the application. The Commission would also sponsor,
sessions in which judges from across the country meet and try to establish
some standards by which the application documents should be
considered. In addition, the Commission would prepare an annual report
to Parliament, more detailed than presently required, assessing the
performance of electronic surveillance in criminal investigations.
If such a Commission was established, it would at least ensure the
reviewability of the authorization documents. However, it is not clear
whether the proposed Commission would have the power to alter the
authorization documents or invalidate the authorization should it have
been obtained through fraud or wilful non-disclosure. This would be
desireable in such a situation.
Further changes would have to be made in order to ensure minimal
intrusion on individual privacy from government agencies. The list of
offences in which electronic surveillance can be carried out should be
limited. Instead of a lengthy list as in Part IV.I the emphasis should be on
the seriousness of the offence with guidelines requiring the judge to take
this into account. As well, the definition of subversive activity under the
Official Secrets Act 128 should be more precise and allow less discretion to
issue warrants than at present.
In the application hearings there should be some third party there to
represent the interests of the object of interception. This would ensure
that proper form and procedure are being followed and thus reduce the
possibility of fraud or non-disclosure. In addition there should be an
explanation of what information is required when applying for a warrant
127. McDonald Commission Second Report, vol. 2, at 1020.
128. R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-3, as amended.
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under the Official Secrets Act 129 and the application process should be
limited to designated agents only.
For applications under Part IV.I there should be a random rotation of
judges thus eliminating the possibility of judge shopping.
In executing the authorization order surreptitious entry should not be
allowed. At present the matter is not quite clear with one court saying the
police cannot enter the premises and others saying they can. Parliament
should make it clear that covert entries are not allowed. In addition,
evidence obtained as a result of such an entry should be inadmissible.
These are some of the recommendations that would reduce intrusion
into individual privacy by government agencies. There are of course
other changes that could increase privacy rights, but short of abolishing
the whole Act, these recommendations should deal effectively with the
major concerns.
VI. Conclusion
The Protection of Privacy Act 130 sought to create a right to privacy, which
before had not existed in Canada, by making it illegal to intercept private
communications by means of electronic devices. It did, however, create
exemptions from liability for the purposes of law enforcement. The Act
therefore sought to maintain a balance of interests between individual
privacy and law enforcement.
While the intent and purpose behind the Act seem agreeable, the
provisions of the Act itself and the way they are being carried out clearly
indicate that the Act favours police investigation more than individual
privacy. This is evident from such things as the wide range of offences in
which electronic surveillance can be used, the allowing of covert entries,
the refusal to allow defence counsel to examine the authorization packets,
the discretionary power given to the judge to allow evidence that would
otherwise be inadmissible and a host of other items.
There does not seem to be much hope for change in the Charter, at
least judging from the early decisions. Therefore it is clear that some
legislative change will be needed. By following the recommendations
suggested, in addition to any other changes Parliament would be willing
to make, the privacy of the individual can be restored and the balance
between individual privacy and law enforcement can be maintained.
129. Id
130. S.C. 1973-74. c. 50, as amended.
